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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
  
  
 This appeal raises a novel question whether a writ of 
habeas corpus can be expanded in its use to produce a prison 
paralegal inmate to assist a fellow prisoner in his civil rights 
action for damages.  The issue arises out of a § 1983 lawsuit 
filed by Michael Jones, a prisoner at the New Jersey State Prison 
in Trenton (TSP), against Captain Louis Hagler, a corrections 
officer at TSP and the sole remaining defendant, in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Jones 
alleged that he was sexually assaulted by his two cellmates and 
that, in placing him in a multiple-lock housing unit reputed to 
contain homosexual inmates who "prey[] on other inmates for sex," 
Hagler acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's personal 
safety.    
 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, 
which the district court denied.  Additionally, Jones filed a 
motion seeking the appointment of counsel to prosecute his civil 
suit, which the court also denied.  The court concluded that, in 
light of Jones' likelihood of success and the type and complexity 
of the case, appointment of counsel was not warranted.  Moreover, 
based upon his prior submissions, the court determined that Jones 
was capable of adequately representing himself.   
 Subsequently, after the court's refusal to appoint 
counsel, Jones requested of the court that Thomas L. Hill, an 
inmate paralegal at TSP, be allowed to assist him at trial.  The 
district court consented and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus 
be directed to the warden of TSP.  Hagler moved for a stay 
pending appeal, which the district court denied.  Hagler then 
  
filed a motion with this court for an emergency stay pending 
appeal, which we granted.  This court also directed the clerk to 
appoint counsel for Jones for this appeal.  Thereafter, Hagler 
timely appealed the district court's order issuing a writ of 
habeas corpus.  We vacate the order authorizing the writ. 
  I.  
 Before we address the propriety of the district court's 
order issuing a writ of habeas corpus to produce a prisoner who 
will act as a lay assistant at a civil trial, we must first 
decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal at this 
stage of the district court proceedings.  Hagler asserts that we 
have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  See Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 Under the doctrine, an interlocutory order is 
immediately appealable if it conclusively determines the matter 
in issue, resolves an important issue completely separate from 
the merits of the action, and is effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.  Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 
223, 231 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  If an order fails 
to satisfy either of these conditions, it is not immediately 
appealable.  Id.  Although the collateral order doctrine is a 
narrow exception, see Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 783 
n.10 (3d Cir. 1982), we are convinced that the three requirements 
are met here. 
 First, the conclusiveness prong of the test is 
satisfied because the district court issued its order in the 
expectation that it will be the final word on the subject.  See 
  
Praxis Properties Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 
55 (3d Cir. 1991).  Next, whether a court has authority to issue 
a habeas corpus writ so that a prisoner can provide lay 
assistance at trial is an important issue completely divorced 
from the merits of the underlying civil rights action.   
 Finally, without immediate review of the district 
court's order, the legal and practical value of the right 
asserted on appeal would be destroyed.  Praxis, 947 F.2d at 58 
(citation omitted).  A review of the propriety of the writ after 
final judgment cannot erase the burden, risk, and expense placed 
upon the state of New Jersey (the State) for transporting and 
maintaining secure custody over the paralegal prisoner.  Although 
courts have consistently rejected claims that the time and 
expense of litigating a suit that may later be reversed are 
sufficient to warrant an immediate appeal, Powers, 4 F.3d at 232, 
the case sub judice is factually distinguishable.  In addition to 
the costs associated with transporting Hill to Jones' civil 
trial, the State will have to bear the real risk, one that we 
have unfortunately experienced in this circuit on more than one 
occasion with other prisoners, that Hill will escape from its 
custody during his temporary respite from prison.  See Price v. 
Johnston, 159 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1947) ("[T]emporary relief 
from prison confinement is always an alluring prospect, and to 
the hardened criminal the possibility of escape lurks in every 
excursion beyond prison walls."), rev'd, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). 
 Moreover, the State's entitlement, in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, to run its prisons efficiently and 
  
effectively without outside federal interference will have been 
compromised, absent an immediate appeal.  Thus, because in the 
case sub judice "review postponed will, in effect, be review 
denied," Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 1988),    
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989), we conclude that the district 
court's order issuing a writ of habeas corpus is effectively 
unreviewable on final appeal.  Id.  See also Lynk v. La Porte 
Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 561 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that the grant or denial of a writ of habeas corpus ad 
testificandum is appealable under the collateral order doctrine); 
Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1984) (same), 
aff'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States 
Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34 (1985); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 
F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1977) (same). 
 II.  
 Our inquiry does not end here.  We must still ascertain 
whether appellant has standing to make the argument that the 
district court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is 
reviewable as a collateral order, as a decision regarding 
immediate appealability will have no effect on him inasmuch as he 
will not have to bear personally the expense and risk inherent in 
transporting Hill.  A recent Supreme Court decision compels an 
affirmative answer.  See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). 
 In discussing the distinction between personal and 
official capacity suits, the Court explained that the real party 
in interest in an official capacity suit is not the individual 
but rather the entity of which the officer is an agent.  Id. at 
  
361.  "A suit against a state official in her official capacity 
therefore should be treated as a suit against the State."  Id.    
As set forth on the caption of Jones' complaint, Hagler also has 
been sued in his official capacity.  In actuality, then, the 
State is also a defendant in this action and Hagler, as a named 
defendant and as an agent of the State, may properly present its 
arguments and concerns.  Accordingly, we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal.    
 III.  
 We now turn to the merits of the appeal.  Hagler 
contends that a federal district court lacks the authority to 
order state officials to produce a state inmate for the purpose 
of providing paralegal assistance at a civil trial.  Whether the 
district court had authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus 
directing the warden of TSP to transport Hill to assist Jones in 
his civil suit is a legal question subject to plenary review.  
See Tudor Dev. Group, v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 
F.2d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 1992).  When review is plenary, no form of 
appellate deference is acceptable.  Salve Regina College v. 
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991).  
 We begin with the district court's statutory authority 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus.  District courts are authorized 
to issue writs only in a number of limited circumstances.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1994).  Under this statute, a writ may extend 
to a prisoner when "[i]t is necessary to bring him into court to 
testify or for trial."  Id. § 2241(c)(5).  Under its terms, this 
provision does not provide authority for a court to remove a 
  
prisoner so that he could provide assistance to another prisoner 
at trial.  Rather, the statute represents the codification of the 
common law writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum and ad 
prosequendum issued when necessary to produce a prisoner to 
prosecute him or obtain his appearance as a witness.  See United 
States v. Hooker, 607 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980).  See also United States v. Larkin, 
978 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1323 
(1993).  Jones did not request the court to grant the writ for 
the foregoing purposes.  Thus, § 2241(c)(5) cannot confer upon 
the district court the power to grant the instant writ.   
 Jones does not take issue with this conclusion.  
Rather, he argues that the All Writs Act (the Act), 28 U.S.C. § 
1651 (1994), "is a flexible and expansive grant of authority for 
federal courts to issue modified versions of habeas writs not 
specifically enumerated in § 2241."  He asserts that his case 
turns not on the district court's power to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus, but on whether the courts may issue the writ "to 
allow lay assistance."   
 The Act, not specifically relating to habeas corpus, 
provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by 
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law."  The language of the Act contains a 
number of fundamental limitations on its scope.  First, the writ 
issued must aid the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.  
See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d 268, 276 (3d Cir.), 
  
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).  Additionally, the means 
selected must be analogous to a common law writ.  Id.   
 Jones contends that the first requirement is met 
inasmuch as the district court possessed jurisdiction over Jones' 
underlying civil rights claims and the court's order granting the 
habeas writ will aid the court by allowing it to manage the case 
to a just conclusion.  As mentioned, the Act authorizes writs to 
be issued only when necessary (or appropriate) to the 
preservation or exercise of a court's jurisdiction.  Rosen v. 
Cascade Intern., Inc., 21 F.3d 1520, 1527 n.13 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(citation omitted).  The cases appear to be elusive in 
establishing a rule of law as to when the writ is "necessary or 
appropriate in aid" of a court's jurisdiction.  Issuance of the 
writ in the present case would appear to have absolutely no 
effect on the district court's jurisdiction to hear and decide 
the underlying civil rights claims.  The court's jurisdiction 
over those claims is independent of the existence of a writ.  
Moreover, the absence of a writ will not destroy the court's 
jurisdiction.  Thus, as the writ is not indispensable to the 
court's disposition of Jones' claims, it facially cannot be 
deemed to be necessary, or even appropriate, and therefore the 
writ is not authorized under the Act.  Id.  
 Contrary to Jones' assertion, In Re Grand Jury does not 
compel a different conclusion.  In In Re Grand Jury we explained 
that the term "necessary" does not have to be interpreted in a 
narrow or rigorous manner.  In Re Grand Jury, 654 F.2d at 276.  
Rather, a court may avail itself of the Act and issue a writ 
  
where helpful "to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it." 
Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 
273 (1942)).     
 Although interpreting the term "necessary" in a less 
rigorous fashion, In Re Grand Jury nonetheless required that the 
writ issued must actually aid the court in the performance of its 
duties.  In the present case, however, the presence of Hill at 
trial does not seem to bestow any benefit on the district court.  
The principal beneficiary will, of course, be Jones.   
 It appears, however, that this distinction is illusory 
in light of United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 
(1977).  Although that case did not involve a writ of habeas 
corpus, the court directed a third party, the New York Telephone 
Company (the Company), to permit the FBI to install and use pen 
registers with respect to two telephones and furnish the FBI with 
information and technical assistance necessary to employ the 
devices.  In response to the Company's challenge to the power of 
a court to authorize the foregoing orders, the Supreme Court held 
that the order compelling the Company to provide assistance was 
clearly authorized by the All Writs Act.  Justice Byron White, 
author of the majority opinion, dismissed, as specious, the 
dissent's distinction under the Act "between orders in aid of a 
court's own duties and jurisdiction and orders designed to better 
enable a party to effectuate his rights and duties."  Id. at 175 
n.23.  He explained that "[c]ourts normally exercise their 
jurisdiction only in order to protect the legal rights of 
parties."  Id.  Thus, Justice White's construction of the phrase 
  
"in aid of" a court's jurisdiction does not appear to preclude 
issuance of the instant habeas corpus writ. 
 Therefore, we turn to the All Writs Act again to 
determine whether the present writ also is "agreeable to the 
usages and principles of law," as that phrase is used in the Act.  
Although the Supreme Court recognized that courts are not 
"confined to the precise forms of that writ in vogue at the 
common law," Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948), this in 
no way implies that courts have the power to fashion any writ 
they deem desirable.  Rather, courts must "look to the usages and 
principles which have attached themselves to the writ of habeas 
corpus down through the years to the present time."  Id.   
 Historically, under the common law and prior thereto 
under the English judicial system, the purpose of the writ has 
been to "produce the body of a person before a court for whatever 
purpose might be essential to the proper disposition of a cause."  
Id. at 283.  For example, over time, the writ has provided a 
"swift and imperative remedy" in cases where a person has claimed 
that his or her personal liberty is being illegally restrained.  
Id.  Thus, to the extent that courts have to deal with claims for 
various types of illegal restraint not specifically provided for 
in a statute, a variation or modification of an established writ 
is in order.  For this reason, the Court in Price held that the 
Act confers authority upon courts of appeal to order a prisoner 
to be brought before it to argue his own appeal in a case 
involving the prisoner's life or liberty.  Id. at 278.  Through 
the centuries of its use, during colonial times and since the 
  
founding of our Republic, the writ has been "the fundamental 
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary 
and lawless state action."  Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-
91 (1969).  The usages and principles which have attached to the 
writ down through the ages have their focus on illegal detention 
and confinement of persons and the correction of miscarriages of 
justice within their reach.  Id. at 291.   
 The writ in issue in this case, however, is not 
directly or indirectly related to the usages or principles of law 
of any of the writs of habeas corpus.1  It is neither reasonable 
nor practical to use a writ historically associated with the 
fight for human freedom to provide a plaintiff, especially in a 
civil proceeding, with a lawfully confined prisoner for 
assistance.  In short, Jones points to no authority, principle, 
or interest of justice, nor have we found any, that would 
convince us to expand the usage of a habeas writ to produce a 
prisoner so that he can aid a fellow prisoner in prosecuting a 
civil suit.  Thus, the writ in issue cannot be said to be 
consistent with typical habeas writs and is therefore not 
"agreeable to the usages and principles of law."  Permitting such 
an expanded usage of the writ would inevitably encourage the 
                     
1
.  The Court in Price noted that Blackstone described the common 
law versions of the habeas corpus writ as habeas corpus ad 
respondendum, ad satisfaciendum, ad proseqeundum, testificandum, 
deliberandum, ad faciendum et recipiendum , and ad subjiciendum. 
Price, 334 U.S. at 281 n.9.  Each of these writs has as its 
purpose the production of a prisoner in court with respect to 
proceedings dealing with the prisoner's personal detention and 
restraint. 
  
usage of "jailhouse" lawyers in the courts, elevate prison costs 
in the transportation and guarding of prisoners to, from, and in 
the courthouse, and seriously increase the risks associated with 
having prisoners outside prison walls. 
 Furthermore, the legal issues raised in the underlying 
litigation are not extraordinary and ordinarily prisoners have 
other reasonable options available.  First, they could proceed 
pro se.  Second, they might, upon a showing of special 
circumstances, even in a civil case, request the trial court to 
appoint counsel for themselves.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1966); 
Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984).  The 
plaintiff in this case did move for the appointment of counsel, 
but after analyzing the complexity of the case and the likelihood 
of success, the district court found that appointment of counsel 
was not warranted.  Finally, there is the possibility of 
obtaining private counsel on a pro bono or contingent fee basis. 
 IV.    
 Accordingly, as the writ issued by the district court 
is not consistent with the usages and purposes behind the 
variants of the habeas writ, we hold that a federal court is not 
empowered, pursuant to the All Writs Act, to order state 
officials to produce a state inmate for the purpose of providing 
assistance at a civil trial.   
 Therefore, the order of the district court of November 
3, 1993, awarding the writ of habeas corpus and the subsidiary 
order of November 15, 1993, granting plaintiff's motion that 
inmate Thomas Hall assist him at the trial will be vacated and 
  
the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 Each side to bear their own costs. 
